populations.
Forest maintenance has significant carbon benefits, as well as other environmental and social advantages.
Prerequisites include understanding causes of deforestation.
I.) TYPES OF FOREST MANAGEMENT FOR CARBON
A.) TIMBER MANAGEMENT
1.) Carbon benefits of timber management
Forest management most commonly refers to timber management.
In the tropics, this includes selectively logging a forest at a specified intensity on a cycle of sufficient duration to maintain a sustainable flow of harvestable wood. Theoretically, standing biomass of natural forests under these regimes can keep carbon out of the atmosphere that would otherwise be released through deforestation. Some modifications in management practices can contribute to maximizing the standing stock of biomass, for example, by refraining from thinning stands of non-commercial species through poison girdling, and by allowing trees to grow larger before harvesting them. Programs to reduce logging impacts on unharvested trees also help reduce emissions that occur through logging damage (Putz and Pinard, 1993) . In addition to carbon held in forest biomass and soil, wood products derived from logging represent pools of carbon kept out of the atmosphere for periods of years or decades, depending on the end use of the wood.
Hardwoods for furniture and construction have the longest lifetimes, and therefore the greatest carbon benefits.
Unfortunately, logging normally functions as a prelude to deforestation regardless of whether it is stamped as "sustainable management" in official documentation.
2.) Socio-economic effects on management
Socio-economic factors can undermine sustainability of management schemes and thereby reduce their true carbon benefits.
Estimates of the probability of socio-economic or political factors interrupting a carbon sequestration management program would of necessity be approximate, but this kind of estimate is nevertheless routinely produced for commercial decisions.
Adjusting carbon calculations would require weighting each year's expected sequestration by the expected probability of its taking place in practice, in a manner similar to that used to adjust for risk and uncertainty in Bayesian calculations of expected monetary value (e.g. Raiffa, 1968) . Experience indicates that timber management plans have low chances of actually producing the carbon benefits expected. Accepting calculated carbon benefits for such proposals at face value is equivalent to expecting to win a million-dollar lottery by buying a one-dollar ticket, neglecting to allow for the minuscule probability of winning the prize. Burgess, 1989: 150) .
Although overharvesting is likely as at least part of the explanation for these discrepancies, some wood offtake also comes from conversion of forest to agriculture.
The argument is frequently made that sustainable forest management (usually taken to mean logging) prevents forest from being willfully destroyed. It is argued that tropical countries must obtain a financial return from their forests, otherwise they will replace them with agriculture. Logging must therefore be encouraged, together with research to find uses for woods from more tree species and to identify sustainable harvest rates and cutting cycle lengths. The potential long-term profits from logging are expected to result in the countries following these sustainable techniques.
The hope placed in the beneficial effect of increasing profits to loggers is based on two expected chains of events.
First, increased profit to loggers results in increased tax revenues, employment, and other benefits to governments; the governments are therefore expected to ensure the long-term continuation of these benefits by instituting restrictions on logging intensity. The second chain of events expected is that greater profit will motivate the loggers themselves to take an interest in guaranteeing continuation of the income stream, leading to investment in long-term production by restriction of logging intensity. Unfortunately, these two chains of events represent an incomplete view of the real-world system. Increasing profit to loggers has other effects that act in the opposite direction, leading to increase of logging intensity and destruction of the resource. Increased profit to loggers also leads to an increase in area logged. Only long-term profits act to lower logging intensity. Wood harvested by increasing logging intensity swells short-term profits to loggers, which motivates loggers to invest in further increasing logging intensity. This reduces to two opposing positive feedback relationships. One, acting through long-term profits, leads logging intensity to be maintained at a reduced level indicated by the maximum sustainable harvest derived from the growth rate of the trees; the other, acting through short-term profits, leads to greater logging intensity. Such a situation is invariably unstable, leading to one extreme or the other. Which way the balance goes depends on the strength of the forces on each side. However, it is not a mystery as to which side is the stronger, as indicated by the obvious lack of commercial-scale forest management systems in the world today. Poore et al. (1989: xiv) surveyed management throughout the tropics and concluded that "the extent of tropical moist forest which is being deliberately managed at an operational scale for the sustainable production of timber is, on a world scale, negligible."
The root of the problem lies in the rapid discounting of future returns applied in financial calculations, leading to decisions to harvest natural populations at unsustainable rates.
This occurs when the discount rate is more than twice the maximum reproductive potential of the population (see Clark, 1973 Clark, , 1976 for mathematical proof). Growth rates of tropical trees are controlled by biological factors having nothing to do with rates of financial return obtainable on investments in other parts of the economy. These biological limitations place sustainable management for timber at an inherent disadvantage (Fearnside, 1989a The danger of forestry management plans being used to legitimize activities that in reality will lead to destruction of forest (and to greenhouse gas emissions) is increased by the presence of corruption. Papua New Guinea is the best-documented example (Marshall, 1990) . The political value of offering forests for destructive use also contravenes any management scenario that might be devised on the basis of data on silviculture and markets.
Making global warming response proposals on the assumption that corruption and local politics are irrelevant is exceedingly naive. Corruption, although the subject of minimal quantitative study and little open discussion, is a critical socio-economic factor in determining the effectiveness of global warming response options in the forest sector. Why, for example, is Costa Rica the focus of so much more international interest for carbon offset projects than Za" ire, even though Za" ire is a much more important country in terms of tropical forests? The notoriety of Za" ire for corruption (e.g. Witte, 1993) is surely an important part of the answer.
3.) Socio-economic impacts of management
Timber management precludes use of the land for agriculture.
This means that agricultural populations must have alternative locations to cultivate, or must turn to other professions to support themselves. It is worth noting that large areas of already cleared land exist in Brazilian Amazonia, and that the tendency to establish agricultural settlement areas in forests on public lands is explained by political expediency rather than physical limits. The path of least resistance is to decree settlement areas on public land, most of which is forested, rather than to expropriate private lands. Even in other parts of the tropics, where agricultural populations are proportionally much larger, the argument that maintaining native forest represents a threat to the poor is fallacious (Fearnside, 1993a) . granted use rights to forest on the condition that only NTFPs be removed, with an allowance for a limited amount of subsistence agriculture (Allegretti, 1990; Fearnside, 1989b reserves, important as they are, occupy a minuscule fraction of the forest area--about 0.6% as of 1993 (Brazil, IBGE, 1993: 116-125) . Carbon stored in the reserves is one argument for their expansion (Brown et al., 1992 This is because expansion of plantations at one location will subsequently increase global supplies of wood products, thereby making prices lower than they otherwise would be, and at other unsubsidized locations would cause marginal plantations to be abandoned and/or would discourage initiation of new plantations.
To the extent that the economic "invisible hand" functions as expected, no net global gain in carbon stocks would result from subsidizing plantations other than the small gain from time lags as the subsidized plantations grow prior to their first harvest, and as additions to wood product pools and areas of unprofitable unsubsidized plantations remain in place for a time while a new equilibrium is established.
3.) Socio-economic impacts of plantations
Conversion of land to plantations can deprive local populations of their means of support (Barnett, 1992) .
Plantations can involve displacement of local populations occupying the sites prior to initiating the schemes. Depending on the social system surrounding use of plantation output, socioeconomic conditions that develop can be highly undesirable. In the case of plantations for charcoal in Brazil, the industry's competitiveness depends on maintaining most of the labor pool under sub-human conditions through a system of debt slavery (Pachauski, 1994; Ribeiro, 1994; Sutton, 1994) .
Plantations in some parts of the world take over commons that are traditionally used by local populations. In India, for example, "social forestry" programs have often benefitted wealthy landholders and paper mills at the expense of rural poor (Centre for Science and Environment, 1985: 51-62; Shiva et al., 1985) .
These plantations often occupy public roadsides or unplanted portions of private landholdings that traditionally provide firewood and animal fodder to poor villagers. In India, the choice of Eucalyptus deprives the poor of useful supplementary products such as foliage for fodder (Saxena, 1989: 82) . Poor people have sometimes reacted by ripping Eucalyptus seedlings out of the nurseries (Joyce, 1988 ). India's social forestry program was launched with the avowed objective of helping the poor (see Eckholm, 1979: 48-56 ).
In Thailand plantations on common lands could result in eviction of hundreds of thousands of people if industrial plans are fully realized (Koohacharoen, 1992 (Fearnside, 1992a) .
2.) Socio-economic effects on agroforestry
The extent to which agroforestry can be expanded is severely limited by markets for the products. Were any significant portion of Brazilian Amazonia converted to agroforestry, for example, markets would be quickly saturated. Input requirements also limit expansion (Fearnside, 1992a 
4.) Recommended role of agroforestry
Agroforestry has real carbon benefits. The priority attached to it for carbon sequestration, however, depends strongly on the forces underlying deforestation in each location. In Brazilian Amazonia, the priority of promoting agroforestry would be low as an anti-deforestation measure (Fearnside, 1992a ). 
3.) Socio-economic impacts of management
Secondary forests can produce biomass and other products useful to humans (Brown and Lugo, 1990) . This option has the advantage of requiring little investment and physical inputs. In Brazilian Amazonia, however, it should be remembered that most secondary forests are growing in degraded cattle pastures and produce less in all respects than do similar forests in shifting cultivation fallows.
An important issue in deciding policy on encouraging different land-use systems is the question of who is to be benefited. Most secondary forests in Brazilian Amazonia are in the hands of large ranchers, many of whom have long enjoyed generous government subsidies for clearing forest and planting pasture. Should these same ranchers receive additional subsidies?
The prospect of granting additional subsidies to these landholders to manage the secondary succession that now occupies their degraded pasture sites implies an official commitment to perpetuating the existing highly skewed distribution of land tenure in the region. At the time of the last agricultural census, 62.3% of private land in the region was in properties over 1000 ha in area, while only 11.1% was in properties under 100 ha in area (Brazil, IBGE, 1989: 297) . The socio-economic impacts of this distribution of land tenure are many (Fearnside, 1985) .
4.) Recommended role of managed succession
Any promotion of managed succession in Brazilian Amazonia should be restricted to small farmers. Better options exist for carbon storage through maintenance of standing native forest. Measures designed to slow deforestation can easily be justified on the basis of carbon benefits (Fearnside, 1992b) .
These measures also have socio-economic consequences.
2.) Socio-economic effects on forest maintenance
Socio-economic factors can lead to "leakage," negating the (Fearnside, 1987) .
Socio-economic factors increase uncertainty of both costs and expected benefits of forest maintenance projects. This is true of both reserve establishment and programs to reduce deforestation, but is especially important for the latter. Unlike plantations, for which accumulated experience makes the costs and benefits relatively well known, forest maintenance is fraught with unknowns.
Many depend on the outcome of struggles between opposing political and economic interest groups. For example, if
heavy taxes were applied to speculative profits from land sales in order to remove one of the primary forces behind deforestation, those expecting to realize such profits would surely object. The fact that the main impediments to forest maintenance are in the realm of political will rather than financial expense makes this option attractive from the monetary cost-effectiveness standpoint for carbon offsets. The same fact also explains why more has not been done to slow deforestation. Political barriers, while they must not be underestimated, should not simply be accepted as immutable. The loss that forest destruction represents needs to be translated into a force of appropriate strength directed at changing the key policies that lie within the government's control (see Fearnside, 1989d) .
3.) Socio-economic impacts of forest maintenance
One of the most persistent myths about deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia is that it is primarily done by the poor. In 1990 and 1991, only 30.5% of the clearing was done by small farmers (defined in Brazilian Amazonia as having less than 100 ha of land), while almost 70% was done by medium and large ranchers (Fearnside, 1993b Global warming could result in millions of deaths in these places over the next century (Daily and Ehrlich, 1990 ).
Global warming must be addressed on a scale sufficient to solve the problem: it is not reasonable to conclude that all possible countermeasures have undesirable effects, therefore we will do nothing. 
